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# MONTHLY REVIEW

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## PAVLOV, FREUD, AND SOVIET PSYCHOLOGY

DR. LAWRENCE S. KUBIE

## THE YUGOSLAV EXPERIMENT

PAUL M. SWEEZY

## AUTOMATION

PHILIP MORRISON

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*The Lolling Masses*

ALEXANDER L. GROSSY

EDITORS . . . LEO HUBERMAN . . . PAUL M. SWEEZY

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## NOTES FROM THE EDITORS

The full analysis of returns from the questionnaire we sent to readers a few months ago will be ready for publication in next month's issue. In the meantime, we are anxious to start taking advantage of one of its revelations as quickly as possible. Most subscribers, the returns indicate, heard about MR through friends, not through advertisements, mailings, or any other channel of communication. What this means is that you, our readers, are our best subscription agents. We would like to enlist your active support and find ways and means of helping you to help us to extend circulation, which of course remains, as always, our number one problem. Here is a suggestion: sit down and type out (or write *legibly*) a list of friends, with addresses, who you think should be getting MR. Send it to us, and we will mail to each person on the list a free copy of either the latest issue or any other recent issue you may designate. Then, if you have time, please follow up by telling or writing your friends that they will soon receive a sample

(continued on inside back cover)

## THE FACTS OF LIFE

"Thank God for the sputniks. They woke us up to the facts of life. Now that we know where we stand and what we are up against, we will be able to take the necessary steps to put things right again." This, with variations, has been the theme song of the elected and self-appointed spokesmen of the United States during the last few hectic months.

Unfortunately, it just isn't so. The sputniks gave us a shock all right. They showed up as ridiculous a lot of the propaganda that has been put out about Russia and communism in the last forty years. They may even have made a permanent dent in our deeply ingrained national superiority complex. But, to judge from published materials, they have done precious little to wake us up to the really decisive facts of life in our time.

The simple truth, which the sputniks symbolize though of course they don't prove, is that planned public enterprise is a much more rational and efficient social system than anarchic private enterprise. The ideological armor of the American ruling class is probably permanently impervious to this particular truth, and it will take a lot more than two sputniks to drive it home to the American people generally. In the meantime, it is very easy, and not altogether implausible, to blame all our shortcomings, relative as well as absolute, on scapegoats like weak leadership, public apathy, interservice rivalries, and so on. In an almost incredibly complicated world, it is often the simplest truths which are the hardest to see and the least likely to be believed.

We do not mean to argue that nothing will be done in response to the sputniks. Of course, a great deal will be done, and much of it will doubtless be all to the good. Thanks to the achievements of Russian scientists, American intellectuals may be looked upon with a little more respect by their countrymen; the movement to raise the salaries and social standing of teachers will receive a salutary impetus; school curricula may even be revised in the direction of providing an education. Since these are matters which we would be the last to underestimate (we thought they were important even before sputnik), we gladly join the chorus of thanks to the appropriate deities.

But from present indications we emphatically do not think that everything is going to be put right again. The United States is not going to regain the lead in rocketry or any other field where we

have already lost it, and we are going to lose the lead in many fields where we still have it. There are many reasons for this, all fundamentally stemming from the superiority of public over private enterprise. It takes a long time to get results in education and science, and the Russians launched their great effort almost exactly forty years ago. The fruits which they are now reaping are as nothing to what is still to come. No conceivable counter effort by the United States within the framework of our present system could enable us to match the Russians' present momentum. Moreover, thanks to the absence from their system of profit-oriented competition with its baneful concomitants of duplicated efforts and concealed results, they achieve much more than we can hope to with a given expenditure of funds and manpower.\*

The plain fact is that the technological balance, which has just begun to shift in favor of the Soviet Union, is going to continue to move in the same direction as long as the United States operates under the insurmountable handicap of a hopelessly obsolete economic system.

This fact, taken together with the major premises of American foreign policy ever since World War II, means that the United States is bound to play an increasingly disruptive and futile role in world affairs. The premises in question are (1) that there exists a threat of Soviet military aggression, (2) that the seriousness of this threat is in direct proportion to Soviet technological and economic capabilities, and (3) it is possible to negotiate with the Soviet Union only "from positions of strength." These premises give rise to an inexorable and horrible logic. Soviet capabilities are going to grow, rapidly and probably at an accelerating rate. They call forth a military response which is certain to fall ever further short of its goal

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\* What soon will be, if it isn't already, a familiar story was retold in the financial section of the *New York Times* of Sunday, February 9th, under the headline: "RUSSIANS IMPRESS 2 G. E. ENGINEERS. Absence of Secrecy, High Level of Technology and Education Are Noted." The two American engineers, after a trip to the Soviet Union, are reported to have said that "Russian electrical technology had caught up with and was now ready to go ahead of Sweden in the extra-high-voltage fields. The Soviet Union was second only to Sweden in long-distance transmission of electric power at 400 kilovolts, the highest voltage now used in the world, they said. The Russians are now working on transmission systems ranging up to 800 k.v., while the American industry is only in the talking stages of experimenting with 500 k.v. 'High-tension lines' in this country are generally at 132 k.v. 'There is no doubt that the Russians will lead the way in this field,' Dr. Abetti said." And the American engineers concluded, with laudable moderation: "The people of the U. S. A. and the world should recognize that in the future this high Russian standard of education and research, coupled with the ability to get extreme concentration in any desired area, will give the U. S. S. R. technological firsts in more areas than the artificial satellite."



of establishing the (relative) position of strength supposed to be the necessary prerequisite for negotiation. Hence no negotiations but instead increasingly frantic and futile efforts to "catch up." The Soviet Union, on its side, seeing these frenzied military preparations and feeling menaced by them, steps up its own military preparations. The logical circle is closed; the arms race goes on at a built-in rising tempo.

Where will it all end?

There are, it seems to us, only three possibilities. The first is war which, if it comes, will almost certainly be in fact if not in form a preventive war launched by the United States in a desperate attempt to prevent the further development of an increasingly obvious "position of weakness."

The second is the gradual development of precisely such a position of weakness to some breaking point where the self-defeating nature of American policy becomes so obvious as to produce an internal crisis from which a changed policy can emerge. Such a denouement need not await the still far-off day when the Soviet Union will have outstripped the United States economically as well as in science and technology. It can come long before that through the defection of America's allies and dependents, a process which is already well under way though still mostly below the surface. They defect not out of any particular love for the Soviet Union (though the prospect of Soviet economic aid makes it easier and hastens the process), but because the American alliance has less and less to offer them. We have long been of the opinion that the key countries in this regard are Germany and Japan: when they defect—at the same time, of course, concluding mutually advantageous arrangements with the Soviet Union and China respectively—it will be hard for the merest schoolboy not to see that the end of the Acheson-Dulles road has finally been reached. Unless there is a prior change in American policy, this is bound to happen some day, but there is no reason to suppose that it is likely to happen soon. The present grim situation may therefore last a long time yet.

The third possibility is such a prior change in American policy, leading to a new international situation with new possibilities for all concerned. What would the new policy look like, and what are the chances of its being adopted in the near future?

In essentials, of course, the new policy must be one of live and let live. The delusion that the Soviet Union is an aggressive military power like Nazi Germany, set to pounce on all its neighbors and deterred only by the threat of "massive retaliation," must be frankly recognized and overcome. The results of World War II must be ac-

cepted as definitive, which means ratifying the new national boundaries in Eastern Europe, abandoning the mischievous doctrines of "rollback" or "liberation," and bringing the new China into the concert of nations as a great power on a par with other great powers. It is important for Americans to realize that these things could be done without giving up any actual or supposed elements of American strength: even the settlement of the Formosa problem could be postponed to a later stage. The point is that the relaxation of tensions which would immediately follow a basic change in American attitude would make possible the gradual solution of what now seem to be insoluble problems. As problems were solved and the two sides had the time and opportunity to test each other's "sincerity" in practice, a mutual withdrawal and reduction of military forces would naturally follow. In the meantime, of course, certain simple agreements which would obviously be to the advantage of all concerned—such as banning further tests of A- and H-bombs, or creating a zone in Central Europe free of nuclear weapons—could be entered into immediately.

There is no good trying to spell out the solutions to all problems in advance; in fact, for the most part they will probably not be "solutions" at all in the usual sense of the term. What is most urgently required, indeed, is that the big powers should *stop* trying to settle everything and should let the peoples in various parts of the world solve (or botch) their own problems, the big powers meanwhile offering such economic assistance as they can afford and stepping in only to prevent or stop wars. This was the original conception behind the United Nations, and it remains perfectly valid. But no genuine steps toward its realization can be taken until the United States gives up once for all the twin notions, one as crazy as the other, that the Soviet Union both wants to conquer the world and can somehow be pushed back into the position of isolation and inferiority it occupied before World War II.

Are there any signs that the United States is in fact on the way to giving up these notions and embarking on a more hopeful course in foreign affairs?

So far as the administration is concerned, the answer of course is none whatever. Dulles remains firmly in control of United States foreign policy, and neither his estimate of the situation nor the course he is steering has changed one iota. Anyone who doubts it should read his revealing letter in reply to Bertrand Russell printed in the *New Statesman* of February 8th.

Among the Democrats, on the other hand, the post-sputnik period has witnessed a considerable amount of soul-searching in the field of foreign affairs, and even so exacting a critic of past Democratic performance as I. F. Stone finds some extremely hopeful in-

dications in these new developments. Writing in his *Weekly* of February 10th, Stone has the following to say:

Senator Hubert H. Humphrey performed a great public service in the Senate last week. He sketched out for the first time what could be an alternative opposition foreign policy for the Democrats. Where others have merely criticized the rigidity of Mr. Dulles or spoken in generalities of the need to search for peace, Senator Humphrey outlined the essential elements of a flexible foreign policy, covering disarmament and every major area of the world from China to Latin America. . . . The Humphrey speech at last gave full expression to those elements [who want the Democrats to strike out on an independent line of their own] and new hope to those who have long looked for a major spokesman in the cause of peace.

Impressed by this report, we decided to take Stone's advice to obtain the February 4th *Congressional Record* and study the Humphrey speech for ourselves. Unfortunately, we were disappointed.

It is not that there aren't some positive aspects about the Humphrey position. He expressly repudiates the Dulles assumptions that the United States is strong enough to force a settlement on the USSR, and that if we only keep the pressure on long enough the Soviet system will collapse. This is the beginning of realism but not much more. There is no sign of any awareness on the part of Humphrey or any of his carefully coordinated Senatorial supporters that for all practical purposes the United States has *already* lost the scientific and technological race with the Soviet Union. The accommodation they want with the Soviet Union is therefore not one of live and let live, but one negotiated from the familiar old Acheson-Dulles "positions of strength" (the phrase occurs repeatedly in the *Congressional Record*). "Strength," said Senator Humphrey, "is the continuing prerequisite for effective bargaining, the one persuasive catalytic agent without which negotiations are futile." Or, in the even more Dulles-like words of Senator Symington: "I am sure we agree that the way to obtain that peace, if there is a way—and God grant there is—is by negotiating with those who may wish to destroy world peace, from a position of relative strength, instead of from one of relative weakness." To which Senator Humphrey replied: "The Senator has put it well. I thoroughly agree." Apparently twelve years in which the United States lost its monopoly of atomic weapons, saw the most populous country in the world go over to the other side, and was decisively defeated in the race to be first into space—apparently these twelve years have taught the Democratic Senators nothing beyond the rather obvious fact that the Soviet Union is not going to succumb to the preachings of John Foster Dulles.

In our judgment, as the reader who followed our earlier argu-

ment will be aware, this addiction to positions of strength dooms the Humphrey policies as decisively as it does the Dulles policies. Whatever you may say, if you are always striving frantically to build up an unattainable position of strength before negotiating, you are never going to be ready to negotiate. And indeed if you believe with Senator Humphrey that your opponent is "a totalitarian dictatorship out to conquer the world" what is there really to negotiate about? It would be more logical to join Mr. Dulles in sitting tight and hoping for the best.

It is, of course, just as well that Senator Humphrey and his friends are *not* as logical as Mr. Dulles. They at least raise important issues—an embargo on arms to the Middle East, some form of troop withdrawal from Germany, bringing China into disarmament discussions, reducing military strength on both sides of the demarcation line in Korea, banning of further A- and H-bomb tests—which have been largely tabu in the past and which it is all to the good to have out in the open and under public discussion. Humphrey's formulations on all these issues are so vague, and his qualifications and provisos so numerous, that one may well doubt that they really mean anything. Still, we must agree with Stone that Humphrey performed a service even if it did fall far short of being "great" and signally failed to outline "the essential elements" of a flexible foreign policy. No doubt these are times when one should be grateful for even the smallest favors.

In the meantime, let us have no illusions about an imminent change in American policy. The reality of Democratic intentions was unfortunately expressed by Senate Majority Leader Lyndon Johnson in the course of giving Humphrey's February 4th speech an enthusiastic sendoff:

Every member of this body is willing to have the United States pay whatever is required to make sure that our nation is protected; and all the members of this body know that the people of America will have to pay through the nose, and that today the United States is not spending nearly enough.

That is the authentic language of the cold war and the arms race. In the past, the Democrats have shown themselves quite as adept as the Republicans at promoting these grandiose enterprises in self-defeat and impoverishment, and it would be prudent to assume that they can do it again. (February 15, 1958)

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*The more we cling to armaments and economic privilege the more frightened we become.*

—American Friends Service Committee, *Speak Truth To Power*.

## PAVLOV, FREUD, AND SOVIET PSYCHOLOGY

BY LAWRENCE S. KUBIE, M.D.

This article continues the dialogue between Soviet and American psychiatrists begun in the December 1957, issue of MONTHLY REVIEW by articles by Dr. D. Fedotov, Director of the Institute of Psychiatry of the Ministry of Health of the USSR, and Dr. Norman Reider, Chief of Psychiatry at Mount Zion Hospital, San Francisco, and Director of Education of the San Francisco Psychoanalytical Society.—THE EDITORS

Official Soviet psychiatry claims to derive its attitudes and its methods from the work of Pavlov. It assumes further that there is an irreconcilable antagonism between Pavlov and the work of Freud. As our Soviet colleagues develop their position, however, they betray surprisingly elementary misconceptions not only about psychoanalysis but even about Pavlov and his works as well. Furthermore they never refer to the many studies which have been made of the remarkable agreements between Pavlov and Freud over basic issues.

It is true that in his early years Pavlov took an extremely anti-psychological position. He fined his students for using such terms as "conscious" or "voluntary." But a few years later he used them himself, differentiated between conscious and unconscious processes, discussed how one influences the other, wrote of the conditions under which "unconscious syntheses could enter the field of consciousness."

Furthermore he discussed the significance of conflicts among conditioned and unconditioned reflexes and among the superimposed and related psychological states. In other words the older Pavlov talked like an analyst.

The mere fact that Pavlov investigated the conditioned reflex as one of the essential constituents of human psychology while Freud investigated more complex levels of integration constitutes no discrepancy, since Freud, like Pavlov, derived his psychology from biogenetic roots. Certainly the later Pavlov would have had little patience with this trumped-up and baseless pseudo-controversy.

Of more specific importance is the fact that, as in all basic sci-

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ences, each investigator used the tool which he had forged as a sampling device. For the one, the sampling depended upon the use of the relationship between conditioned and unconditioned reflexes. For the other, the sampling device is the technique of free-association. In the one, the laboratory is the constant setting of the experiment. In the other, the unvarying and formal structure of the psychoanalytic session constitutes the constant environment in which observations are made. Both settings are designed specifically to reduce all accidental and extrinsic variables to a minimum, so that the role of the intrinsic variables which are under study can be evaluated. What is more, it has been shown that these two sampling techniques, the psychoanalytic technique of free association and the technique of conditioned reflexes, are mirror images of each other. These considerations bring one to conclude that Pavlov and Freud represent mutually supplementary techniques, which are in no way opposed to one another, either in technical procedure or in theoretical implications.

Behind this misleading and essentially meaningless controversy are ideological issues for which the scientific issues are a mask. Such ideological considerations have no valid place in scientific controversies. They distort the real issues and weight the scales with irrelevant considerations. Sometimes this leads to such pseudo-scientific abortions as those which threatened to distort the work of Soviet geneticists a few years ago. Similar extraneous considerations are injected into the Soviet attitude to analysis, on the basis of wholly erroneous preconceptions and assumptions.

For instance, the concept of flexible adaptability as an index of mental health is misinterpreted and misunderstood. Instead of seeing that adaptability is an index of man's freedom to respond appropriately to external and internal changes, it is mistakenly assumed that it implies that the aim of analysis is to make people spinelessly submissive to injustice. This accusation, of course, has a familiar ring. It is a carryover from one of the stock criticisms of religious institutions: a criticism not always valid, but not always baseless either. For it is true, of course, that any cultural instrument by which man attempts to seek freedom can also be exploited to enslave him. This is true of the police, of government, of labor unions, of religion itself, and of the misuse of psychology in advertising. Yet it is wholly invalid to conclude that this misuse is an inherent and necessary aspect of any one of these. Actually, psychological health is synonymous with freedom, both from external and internal tyrannies. In turn this is one reason why authoritarian churches and authoritarian governments, whether of the extreme Right or of the extreme Left, attack psychoanalysis with equal bitterness.

Again, analysis is criticized because it is not a technique which can be applied to human beings en masse. This comment is true, of course; but it overlooks the main goal and purpose of analysis. Psychoanalysis has been a pilot test of a technique which by slow and humble methods has acquired microscopic information about the neurotic process. Up to recent years while conducting these tests analysis, for many reasons, has had to use the rich as the guinea pigs rather than the poor. One can be confident, however, that in the course of time the information thus gained will be used for the development of techniques of mass prevention. The time for that has not yet arrived. All of medicine has followed this pattern. In the conquest of each infectious disease, the bacteriologist has had to examine specimens from many thousands of individual patients before he could develop a serum for prophylaxis or for cure of the many.

On a more philosophical plane, the psychoanalyst challenges an implicit Soviet assumption that the major source of human discontent lies in poverty, and in economic and political inequities. The analyst finds that inequitable social, economic, and political forces play an important but secondary role in the chain of events which constitute the neurotic process. These exercise a powerful influence on the fate of the neurotic process, on its cost in human suffering, and on the forms it takes; but they do not originate it. The roots of the neurotic process are more universal than any such special circumstances. Neither freedom nor slavery, poverty nor wealth, leisure nor exhaustion, indolence nor overwork, initiates the neurotic process.

Furthermore, analysts in general tend to be more distrustful of the brutalizing consequences of a naked struggle for power than of the consequences of rivalry for wealth and display. Therefore they are skeptical of any assumption that the elimination of competition for wealth and display will solve the problem of the neurosis. They know that man can be unhappy and neurotically ill even under the most privileged circumstances, whether he lives in a hypothetically ideal capitalist democracy, or in an ideally successful Communist milieu.

Let me repeat that the analyst knows that distorting influences which arise in the social scene have a powerful effect upon secondary and tertiary consequences of the neurotic process; but that they never are its primary sources. He points out that every social institution which human ingenuity has as yet devised has also been exploited by the neurotic process, and in turn exploits, masks, and even rewards it. This is equally true of authoritarian and democratic forms of government, and of socialist and capitalist economies. These in-

teract with the neurosis in different ways; but the analyst knows that no form of economic or political organization is free of guile or of responsibility for the neurotic betrayal of man's aspirations. Therefore there is no self-righteous chauvinism in pointing out that the Soviet view of psychoanalysis has been warped by irrelevant and inaccurate ideological considerations.

## THE YUGOSLAV EXPERIMENT

BY PAUL M. SWEETZ

Yugoslavia strikes the foreign visitor as being, by Western standards, a very backward country, though it is by no means uniformly so—the spread runs all the way from the Central European level of Slovenia and parts of Croatia to the most retarded Asian standards of the Autonomous Territory of Kosovo-Metohija on the northeast border of Albania.\* On the economic side, this diversity is basically an asset since the more advanced regions can do much to assist the development of the rest of the country, but at the same time it is closely related to certain deep-rooted problems which inevitably slow down the rate of progress. In this connection, I need only mention here the division of the country into six major nationalities and a considerably larger number of smaller ethnic groups: it is hard for a person coming from an environment which is, in point of language and customs, relatively uniform to imagine the number and intractability of the problems created by this kind of extreme cultural heterogeneity. For this and other reasons, some of which I shall touch upon later, Yugoslavia has none of that air of a highly dynamic,

\* My personal impressions were confined to the Belgrade area (the Voivodina and northern Serbia) where I spent ten days at the end of November 1957. I have also, of course, consulted materials published in the Western languages, especially C. Bobrowski, *La Yougoslavie Socialiste*, Paris, 1956. A voluntary exile from Poland in the late 40s and early 50s, Bobrowski is now Vice Chairman of the State Economic Council and one of the leading economists of Poland. I found that in Yugoslavia Bobrowski's book is generally regarded, by both admirers and critics of the regime, as the best description and analysis of the new Yugoslav economic and social system.



rapidly developing economy which is perhaps the most striking characteristic of the Soviet Union.

At the same time, however, Yugoslavia gives the impression of being an eminently stable society—much more so, for example, than Poland. With all its faults and imperfections, the present system works reasonably well. Thanks largely to American assistance over the years, the shops are adequately stocked with consumers' goods, imports from Germany playing a particularly conspicuous role. Within the fairly wide limits set by the regime's concern for its own security, the individual now enjoys a considerable measure of freedom, the Djilas case to the contrary notwithstanding: Djilas as the erstwhile number two man was and is considered to be a definite threat to the security of the regime and is being treated accordingly.\*

People generally are proud of the independent role that Yugoslavia has been playing on the international stage during the last ten years. And while it would be absurd to speak of the Yugoslavs' being satisfied with their present lot, it is nevertheless true that most of them are better off than they or their parents were under the old order and that they accept the present regime as unquestioningly as most Americans accept *their* regime. The acutely dissatisfied think in terms of emigration rather than revolution.

Before attempting to comment on the character and performance of the Yugoslav system, I would like to set down a few notes which may be of some general interest. The generation which fought the war of liberation and made the Yugoslav Revolution has not been successful in transmitting its enthusiasm and idealism to the youth of today. By and large, Yugoslav young people are interested in their

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\* After reading Djilas's book *The New Class*, I am inclined to think the regime is wrong in considering it a danger. Actually, it adduces absolutely no new factual material and is analytically a frightful muddle. But this is not the point: I think the regime *does* consider Djilas to be a threat to its security and has jailed him for this reason and not out of any addiction to thought control such as afflicts the Soviet leadership. There is an additional point worth mentioning in this connection, one which I have missed in the comments on the Djilas case which happen to have come to my attention: Yugoslavia today is ruled by an elite in a very special sense of the term, an elite which was formed in the fires of the Partisan war of national liberation and is bound together by almost mystical ties of sacrifice and brotherhood. The fact that Djilas belonged to the innermost circle naturally greatly aggravates his crime in the eyes of his former comrades. This is not to say that his criticisms of their more recent way of life may not have been quite justified—and probably even effective. One final point: every friend of the new Yugoslavia must hope that the regime will see that now, whatever may have been the case a few years ago, both its own security and the cause of socialism generally have more to gain from the release of Djilas than from his retention in jail.

own careers and private lives, and they have no sense of a great national mission such as sustains a kind of idealism among Russian youth. This state of affairs is deeply disturbing to thoughtful people, but no one seems to have any clear idea about how it can be improved. I was told that responsible youth leaders were pressing for authorization to launch large-scale voluntary projects like the famous Youth Railroad of a decade ago in order to enlist the enthusiasm and stimulate the feeling of solidarity of the young people. Tito, it was said, was strongly in favor, but the regime's economists were objecting on the ground that such projects are very costly in relation to what they achieve and hence could not be afforded in Yugoslavia's present circumstances. But it seems clear that regardless of the outcome of this debate, no general solutions can be found along these lines.\* The problem is much deeper, that of generating a whole new moral and ethical climate in which the traditional aims and ideals of socialism can be brought to fruition. Yugoslavia, unfortunately, has not found a solution. I must add, however, that in saying this I intend no criticism. The Soviet Union has not found a solution either, and in my judgment it is much too early to assess the Chinese achievement in this respect: the crucial tests come only after a revolution has passed through its initial period of triumph and reconstruction. In the long run, I am convinced, it will be in this area, and not in the sphere of technology or economics, that socialism will be judged a success or failure. And if I am right in this, it is already long past time that socialists the world over should face up to the problem in all its baffling complexity.

Let us turn now to the Yugoslav economy.

Up to the break with the Cominform, the Yugoslav system was

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\* Since the above was written, a dispatch from Belgrade by Eric Bourne in the *Christian Science Monitor* (February 6) reports that "Yugoslavia's Communist leaders have decided to revive the employment of youth in supposedly volunteer brigades working on construction projects in an effort to arrest the drift of the nation's present teen-age generation away from politics." The first project is to be completion of a stretch of highway between Ljubljana and Zagreb. Bourne writes that the decision was announced by Tito at a recent Yugoslav Youth Congress and adds, by way of explanation, the following interesting information: "A year ago Marshal Tito, during an inquiry into the political apathy apparent among the youth, lamented that they had somehow 'slipped from our hands' and, moreover, that they were more influenced by 'decadent' Western ideas than by the lofty ideals of building socialism in Yugoslavia. . . . At the [Youth] Congress, the national youth leader, Mika Tripalo, spoke up in defense of Yugoslavia's young people. They could not be blamed, he said, if they lacked the enthusiasm of an earlier generation which had been through the inspiring years of the revolution. They were the products of a generation and an age which often showed much the same symptoms all over the world and they and their problems must be comprehended in that sense."

## THE YUGOSLAV EXPERIMENT

closely modeled on the Russian. It was an extreme form of *centralized, administrative, and bureaucratic* planning.

The system was centralized in the sense that all important decisions (and of course many not so important) relating to investment, production, and prices were made at the top.

The system was administrative in the sense that decisions were made by administrative fiat and could be as general or specific in their applicability as the situation seemed to require.

The system was bureaucratic in the sense that decisions were carried out through a bureaucratic apparatus in which authority ran from the top down and responsibility from the bottom up.

The reforms undertaken after Yugoslavia's expulsion from the Cominform added up to a radical break with the earlier system in all three respects.

An attempt was made to reduce drastically the sphere of centralized decision making. To be sure, all matters relating to the military, the police, and relations with foreign countries remain as before under the control of the Federal government. But apart from these, only two areas continue to be the direct responsibility of the central authorities: first, fiscal policy in the broadest sense, including especially the division of the national income between accumulation and consumption (chiefly via taxation and a combination of grants and loans); and second, major investment projects of national importance which, under the new arrangement as under the old, are both initiated and carried out from the center. For the rest, authority to make decisions relating to investment, production, and prices was turned over to (a) the economic enterprises themselves, and (b) the regional (Republican) governments and the popularly elected committees at the community level. The enterprise in turn, while remaining national property (except in agriculture and handicrafts), was put in charge of its own workers who now occupy much the same position as stockholders in an American corporation, electing a council which chooses and supervises management much as American boards of directors do. The manner of disposal of the enterprise's net income is, of course, carefully regulated by law, with provision being made for a limited incentive-sharing by the workers and the responsible local authorities.

This sweeping limitation of the role of the central government had as a necessary consequence the elimination of administrative forms of management from large sectors of the economy. What was to be put in their place? Or, expressed otherwise, how could the system remain planned and coordinated in the face of such a drastic decentralization program? The answer was twofold. On the one

hand, the market (which may be thought of as comprising the concepts of supply and demand, competition, prices) would take over the job of regulating production and most investment decisions. And on the other hand, the central government would exercise an overall shaping and directing function, not through administration, however, but through legislation, that is to say, through the enactment and enforcement of general laws applicable to all alike—the law governing the disposal of the enterprise's net income being a good example. Bobrowski remarks, very justly, that "it is precisely the proliferation of written, public legislation which most clearly differentiates the Yugoslav system from that of the USSR and the People's Democracies."<sup>\*</sup>

The bureaucratic aspect of the system was sought to be reduced, and in some areas eliminated altogether, by placing both power and responsibility in the hands of workers (in the case of enterprises) and citizens (in the case of regional and local governments). The functions of the central planners—outside the special reserved areas enumerated above—were thus reduced on the one hand to gathering data, studying the operation and potentialities of the system, attempting to foresee developments and opportunities, and so on; and on the other hand to providing information, advice, and encouragement. The central planners cannot impose their will on the lower bodies but must achieve their aims by persuasion and the creation of a favorable framework and atmosphere.

Agriculture, which is still the source of livelihood of a majority of Yugoslavs, differs from industry and trade in that the land and capital are privately owned, but as far as the operation of the planning system is concerned there are no basic differences. Most of the collectives of the earlier period were dissolved after the reform, though practically all peasants now belong to one or more cooperatives organized for marketing, supply, credit, and so on. There is an upper limit (varying according to natural conditions) on the amount of land an individual can own, which prevents the development of landlordism. The old, highly inefficient strip system of holdings is still in force; and in fact the peasants for the most part continue to cultivate the land in much the same way and in response to the same incentives as their ancestors before them. The planners at the top try, without spectacular success (as they will tell you), to improve the situation by education, exhortation, demonstration. But they have neither the responsibility nor the power to intervene administratively in this field any more than in industry and trade.

It may be said, I think, that the most striking success of the

<sup>\*</sup> *La Yugoslavie Socialiste*, p. 145.

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new Yugoslav system is precisely that it proves that a socialist economy can be radically decentralized and debureaucratized. Just how radical the operation was can be judged from the following table, taken from Bobrowski's book (p. 144), showing the number of functionaries and budget expenses at the three levels of government in 1953, by which time the new system was substantially formed. The Federal figures exclude army, police, and military expenses. Similarly, grants from the Federal to the Republican governments are excluded from the Federal budget, and grants from the Republicans to the localities are excluded from the Republican budgets.

	<i>Functionaries</i> (thousands)	<i>Budget</i> (billions of dinars)
Federal government	7.2	30
Republican governments	33.6	39
Popular committees	164.6	39

That only 3.5 percent of all functionaries dealing with civilian affairs are employed by the Federal government is a remarkable fact, as is the very high proportion (more than 80 percent) who are directly responsible to the popular committees at the local level.

Nevertheless, and this must be emphasized, the Yugoslav system remains both socialist and planned. There is no large-scale private ownership, and the autonomy of the individual enterprises, while genuine, is regulated by laws which are clearly socialist in aim and content. Moreover, the plans periodically adopted by the Federal government are no mere collections of pious hopes and sentiments: they completely determine the distribution of the national income, and they successfully map out in advance the route which the economy actually follows.

For reasons which I shall indicate in a moment, I think the Yugoslavs have gone too far in the direction of decentralization, but it seems to me that this in no way detracts from the epoch-making importance of their achievement in demonstrating the viability and stability of a decentralized system in which real power and responsibility are exercised from below. The Russians had already proved that a system of highly centralized administrative planning works, and many people had come to assume that this was the only possible form for a socialist economy to take. The Yugoslavs have refuted this assumption once and for all, and in so doing they have opened up new vistas to the human race. However much or little of their present arrangement survives the tests of time and experience, this exciting breakthrough into new historic terrain will forever stand to their credit.

In terms of economic performance, the achievements of the Yu-

goslav system have been somewhat mixed. Total industrial production has increased at the relatively rapid rate of nearly 20 percent per annum since 1953.\* Unfortunately, however, this has not been fast enough to absorb the natural increment of the working force and at the same time to give employment to the surplus agricultural population which is the historic curse of all underdeveloped peasant countries. The disease which economists call structural unemployment still exists in Yugoslavia; and, given present rates of population increase (about 1.6 percent per annum) and economic growth, it will continue to exist indefinitely. That this is thoroughly unsatisfactory from a socialist point of view goes without saying: it clearly indicates the desirability of a higher rate of economic development than the Yugoslav system has yet shown itself capable of.

The agricultural performance has been unimpressive, as one would of course expect, the limitations of individual peasant farming being what they are. And additional difficulties arising from an earlier forced collectivization drive and a number of bad harvests created a real crisis situation for several years. Nineteen fifty-six and 1957 showed improvement which, allowing for normal ups and downs due to weather conditions, may be expected to continue, though at much too slow a pace to keep agriculture from being a persistent drag on the development of the system as a whole. It is in this field that the heritage of backwardness is most difficult to overcome, and the Yugoslavs started from a very backward condition indeed. Eventually, of course, some form of collectivization will have to come, but my impression is that that day is still a long way in the future.

Let us now consider those weaknesses of the system which would appear to be remediable in the relatively near future.

At the top of the list I would put the present system of industrial organization. The Yugoslav doctrine is that every enterprise must be controlled by its own workers, and there is undoubtedly much to be said for it. I was told many stories of workers' taking an interest in and learning about the affairs of their factories or shops and thus becoming both better workers and better citizens. While all sweeping generalizations on the subject are suspect, I am quite willing to accept the gist of this argument as valid and important. At the same time, the statistics indicate hardly any increase in pro-

\* I have before me a clipping from the December 1957 Economic Supplement to the Paris edition of the *New York Herald Tribune*, showing "indices of Western Europe's Industrial Production" and for some unexplained reason including Yugoslavia. With 1953 as 100, the Yugoslav index for the latest month reported (August) stood at 173, as against 153 for West Germany and 151 for France (both October) and smaller figures for all other countries.

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ductivity in recent years, and it seems reasonable to assume that if workers' control has been a favorable factor there must have been aspects of the present system which were working in the opposite direction. Could it not be that in applying the doctrine of workers' control the economy has been broken up into autonomous units in such a way as to defy the logic of modern technological and managerial methods?

I strongly suspect that this is indeed the case, and my suspicion is based not only on theoretical grounds but also on bits of evidence which certainly have the look of being symptomatic of a general state of affairs. What is one to think, for example, when one reads that "the largest enterprise of Yugoslavia—the railroads—have been transformed into a union of a hundred and sixty more or less autonomous enterprises"?\* Can this really be a sensible way to run what is after all a rather small railroad network? Or again, can it be economically sound in a country with a very limited market to have four or five radio factories each making complete sets? Is it not obvious that it would be more efficient to have a greater degree of specialization in the making of components, the assembling of sets, and so on?

I imagine that if one had the opportunity to make a detailed investigation, one would find that most industries suffer from organizational weaknesses of this sort, for the truth is that the system as at present set up tends to generate and accentuate them. Each place of work, no matter what its economic function, has a tendency to become not only autonomous but as self-sufficient as it can, and there are no counter-pressures acting on it to expand into new areas or join forces with enterprises already established in complementary lines of activity. Suppose, for example, that a box factory saw an opportunity to improve its efficiency and profits by setting up a sawmill. From an economic point of view, this would make sense and any capitalist entrepreneur who was on his toes would naturally proceed to do it: it is, in fact, by a process analogous to this that the great capitalist combines are built up. But a workers' management in Yugoslavia would have no incentive to follow this course, for the moment the sawmill was established its workers would naturally claim the right to constitute themselves a self-governing unit and to manage their own affairs. Under these circumstances, the question whether or not to set up the sawmill devolves by default on the local popular committee, which whatever its other merits is certainly not well qualified for this particular task. As a result the sawmill either doesn't get established; or, if it does, its activities are unlikely to be properly coordinated with those of the box factory.

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\* Bobrowski, *La Yugoslavia Socialiste*, p. 172.



If I am right in guessing that this sort of thing pervades the Yugoslav economy, then surely there is no mystery about the stagnation of productivity which has characterized recent years. By placing economic power and responsibility at the lowest possible level and keeping it there, the system has in effect prevented the development of an effective substitute for what under capitalism is called the entrepreneurial function—and has at the same time and inevitably depressed the rate of economic development below what the country's natural resources and skills would have made possible.

Let no one imagine that there is a simple solution to this problem. To be sure, the Soviet system has shown that the system of centralized planning more than compensates for the disappearance of the capitalist entrepreneur: its weaknesses are of another kind altogether, and some may even feel that its natural bias toward innovation and coordination of complementary economic activities is too strong rather than too weak. But this is no answer for the Yugoslavs: they abandoned the Soviet system for good and sufficient reasons and have no intention of returning to it. They believe—and I think quite rightly—that the system of workers' control has great merit, and they mean to keep it. The question is whether they can *modify* it to provide the necessary substitute for the entrepreneurial function. I think (and hope) that the answer is yes. It seems to me that larger economic units—call them trusts or combines or what you will—have to be not only allowed but deliberately organized and that workers have to develop ways and means (perhaps through the unions?) for participating at every level in the control and management of these larger units. Only in this way, it seems to me, can the Yugoslavs hope to retain the excellent features of their present system and at the same time reap the full benefits of modern technology and the managerial art.

There are two other major areas in which it seems to me the Yugoslav economy is in need of constructive reform: the determination of prices and the allocation of investment.

At the present time, prices are set by the individual enterprises subject only to general legal prohibitions against what we in this country would call combinations in restraint of trade. It is of course expected that the enterprises will attempt to maximize their profits—indeed the laws are framed to encourage them to do so—but competition is relied upon to prevent the development of undesirable monopolistic (or oligopolistic) practices and distortions. Opinions differ as to how well this method works. Bobrowski is optimistic: "In relying on the mechanism of the market, it [the economic system] runs little risk of being deceived. The fact is that, apart from foreign transactions, the Yugoslav market is, thanks to nationalization and



the absence of agreements among producers, closer than any other to the model of perfect competition.”\* Others are not so sure, and I must admit that my none-too-successful attempts to probe into this problem left me in the category of doubters. The Yugoslav market may be closer than that of any other country to perfect competition, but that doesn’t mean that it is very close, and I was told of apparently well authenticated cases of what seemed clearly to be monopolistic practices. I would judge that the problem is bound to get more serious as the economy develops—especially, of course, if and when the need for larger-scale organization is recognized—and that the Yugoslavs will eventually have to accept the necessity of establishing a centralized system of price controls for at least some of the key areas of the economy.

The truth is that no one who has an interest in the resulting profits can be trusted to set prices: the conflict between the individual interest and the common interest is too obvious and inescapable. This, incidentally, is in no way contradicted by the theory of perfect competition, which in fact assumes that no individual does have the power of setting prices. (In the theory of perfect competition, “the market” is not a mere abstraction but a functioning institution where buyers and sellers meet and prices result from the matching of bids and offers, as happens today, for example, in the New York stock market.) I see no way out of this dilemma except through the establishment of a public price-fixing mechanism, operating in accordance with legally defined and enforced norms. For reasons which cannot be entered into here, I don’t think this is possible under capitalism (and at bottom this is the reason why capitalism is not a viable economic system), but I think it is possible under socialism. The Yugoslavs are already working out the necessary legal theories and forms in other areas of the economy. What they need to do now is frankly to face up to the basic economic problem. They will find that they are by no means alone, this being one of the major pre-occupations of economists in all the other socialist countries. Not that they will find any ready-made solutions; there are none, and it may be that nothing better than compromise makeshifts will ever be devised. But if this is so, it is better to get on with the job of working out the best possible makeshifts than to continue to kid oneself about the supposed sovereign virtues of “competition.”

Finally, a word about the allocation of investment. At the present time, the procedure, as I understand it, is somewhat as follows: For major national projects like dams or highways the central planners are directly responsible, and they are presumably guided by long-range

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\* *La Yugoslavie Socialiste*, p. 186.

considerations relating to the development of the economy as a whole. Similarly, at the regional and local levels, there is a range of projects which are the responsibility of the Republican and community governments, and these are more or less effectively coordinated with the activities of the Federal government. All of this, however, affects mainly what we would call public works. So far as industry and trade are concerned, investment funds are for the most part allocated by the State Bank to the various autonomous enterprises on the basis of familiar commercial criteria. The upshot is that while the total amount of investment is centrally planned, only a part of it is allocated in this way, the rest being carried out in accordance with criteria established by the market.

This may be a workable system, but I do not think it is one with which socialists can be satisfied. Most of the reasons were set forth, at least by implication, many years ago in Professor A. C. Pigou's pioneering work *The Economics of Welfare*, and they are well known to bourgeois economists, who, however, must be satisfied with talking about them since it is obvious that nothing effective can be done about them in a regime dominated by the "furies of private interest." Very briefly, the point is that to allocate investment solely by profit-and-loss criteria is *inevitably* to neglect (1) vital long-run considerations, and (2) all the social benefits and damages which may result from investment but which have no reflection in the accounts of the individual firms. This does not mean that profit-and-loss criteria can be neglected, but it does mean that they need to be supplemented by specifically social criteria. And this in turn means that all major investment projects, whether they happen to fall in the field of public works or of industry and trade, should be planned and coordinated with a view to the general welfare of the society as a whole. That this may mean some increase in "bureaucracy" is doubtless true. The problem of democracy is to learn how to control the bureaucrats, not how to do away with them altogether.

In conclusion, I should like to make two points which I think are particularly important for socialists in other countries who are wondering what specific lessons they can learn from the Yugoslav experiment.

First, the Yugoslav system cannot simply be taken over or copied by just any country regardless of its background or stage of development. What Bobrowski has to say on this is so much to the point that I can do no better than quote him at some length:

... the application of the Yugoslav system does not appear possible unless the starting point is a degree of socialist evolution and a certain stage of economic development. It is hard

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to see how a country could adopt it from the outset without having gone through a more administrative phase of planning and management. A certain level of industrialization, the primary condition of the present Yugoslav political system, is also indispensable from the point of view of the functioning of the economic system. If the mechanisms for redistributing the national revenues are simple, the reason is that they utilize in the first instance the nationalized industrial enterprises.

Finally, the Yugoslav economic system is not conceivable in just any type of political system. From this point of view it is indispensable that there should be on the one hand a high degree of decentralization and on the other hand a central power which uses its prerogatives sparingly but which is strong and capable of assuring the meshing of the wheels of the state and the autonomous enterprises. . . . There is no reason to assume that the present Yugoslav institutional setup is the only one which could fulfill these requirements. But it does seem that without a far-reaching revolutionary movement deeply rooted in the country's social reality, it would be impossible to satisfy the indispensable conditions for the functioning of an institutional system of this nature.

The disappearance of capitalist property, a certain measure of industrialization, an institutional framework inconceivable without certain accompanying political and social conditions—these all form together with the Yugoslav system of planning and management an indivisible "whole." Just as in the case of the other integral parts of this whole, so the system of planning and management is the product of a concrete experience of socialist transformation. True, its analysis provides certain conclusions which remain valid outside this framework, but its adoption as a coherent and more or less complete system is inconceivable except in conjunction with a program of socialist transformation. A planning system is not a technique which can be transplanted at will.\*

The relevance of these remarks, based on a profound study of the Yugoslav experience, to countries like India which are now struggling to introduce their own planning systems is immediate and obvious.

The second and final point I want to make is related to what Bobrowski says about a certain level of economic development being the prerequisite for a system of the Yugoslav type. I wonder if the same reasoning can't be extended to reach the proposition that the more highly developed an economy is the more likely it would be to work well under a decentralized and debureaucratized planning system? It is certain that the more backward a country is the more

\* *La Yugoslavie Socialiste*, pp. 188-189.

it needs rapid development, and this seems to require both centralized planning and administrative methods of management. But when it reaches a higher stage of development, it can afford to slow down the rate of advance and to concentrate more and more on the qualitative aspects of social life. The Yugoslavs may have introduced their system too early to realize its full benefits—or to escape bearing the full burden of its weaknesses. But that is no reason to assume that their great experiment will have been in vain. Some day, somewhere, a system of planning plus workers' control will be tried under conditions far more favorable than those which have existed in Yugoslavia during these difficult years. And when it is tried, its chances of success will be much greater for its being able to learn from the achievements and mistakes of Yugoslavia.

## CONTEST . . .

### WHO SAID IT? WHEN? WHERE?

Last month we offered any MR Press book as a prize to the first person who identified this quotation:

*Here in America we are descended in blood and in spirit from revolutionists and rebels—men and women who dared to dissent from accepted doctrine. Without exhaustive debate, even heated debate, of ideas and programs, free government would weaken and wither. But if we allow ourselves to be persuaded that every individual or party that takes issue with our own convictions is necessarily wicked and treasonable, then, indeed, we are approaching the end of freedom's road.*

Dwight D. Eisenhower said it at Columbia University May 31, 1954.

Two readers, sent in, almost simultaneously, the correct answers. Copies of Paul Baran's *Political Economy of Growth* go to Susan Warren of New York and Sylvia Powell of San Francisco. Sylvia Powell, of course, is a co-defendant in the Powell-Schuman case which we have commented upon before in this space. The case is still dragging on, and your assistance is needed. Send funds or requests for information to the Powell-Schuman Defense Fund, P. O. Box 1808, San Francisco 1, California.

## THE LOLLING MASSES

BY ALEXANDER L. CROSBY

The socialist cause in the United States has been done in by push-buttons.

Let us consider the theory before turning to the documentation. What makes a man rebel against the established order? Exploitation, starvation, privation, indignation, frustration, irritation, tribulation, desperation and the other *ations* are the reason why we go for the *isms* of the Left.

Of course there are one or two exceptions to the law of *ations*. The fires of rebellion are never fanned by remuneration or any other form of compensation. Undue consumption of libation has often led to individual assaults on the blue-coated guardians of the existing order, but these uprisings tend to be wanting in class character. Further, they don't last long enough to provide data for even a doctoral thesis.

Now, what causes frustration, privation, indignation, and the other inflammatory *ations*? Think of yourself for a moment as a consecrated capitalist at heart. Then imagine:

1. Harnessing the horse for a 3-mile buggy ride on a 15° night to summon the doctor for the delivery of your first child. Or delivering it yourself.
2. Felling trees, sawing and splitting them to feed the avaricious Franklin stove that provides the only warm spot except the kitchen.
3. Bathing occasionally in a tub shallowly filled with kettles from the kitchen stove in a room feebly warmed by an oil heater.
4. Watching the terrible crow's feet march across the gaunt face of your beloved as she arches her back over the washboard, tears her shoulder muscles with the heavy buckets hauled from the pump, strains her innards with the mechanical bread mixer—and so on through a series of cruelties too horrible to enumerate.
5. Dabbing at the tears as your firstborn is lowered into an untimely grave, just because of his childish whimsy in upsetting the kerosene lamp.

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These were the trials that drove men and women to Debs, Marx, and sometimes drink.

These were the sparks in the powder factory that Thomas A. Edison, Alexander Graham Bell, Henry Ford, and their ilk labored to smother with their wet blankets. Or, more precisely, with their epochal inventions.

It is an interesting fact, overlooked by most Marxist scholars, that the ruling class first undertook to subdue the American woman, not the American man. The reasoning may have been a cynical conviction that men are politically and socially impotent in our near-matriarchate, so why bother about them? Or it could have been an assumption that the female is a natural ally of the status quo—unless hardships make her rebellious. Whatever the theory, the evidence is that the big boys set out to dissipate the dissidence of the drudging dames.

First they gave the ladies the telephone, a mistake that can never be corrected. Their next bribe was the electric light. Then came a long list of magical devices: the electric refrigerator, the oil furnace, the electric iron, the vacuum cleaner, the electric mixer, the electric oven, and the electric washing machine. The electric clock was provided to count the electrically idle hours and the radio was supplied to fill them with something worse than nothing.

But some of the ladies were not satisfied. Driving an automobile, they pointed out, involved the use of muscles. Raising a window strained the diaphragm; shifting gears was exhausting and hard to comprehend; applying the brakes was such a chore that many a matron found it easier to go clean through the garage and whatever stood beyond it. The mere labor of turning the wheel on the drive to the country club left the driver too debilitated to hold up her hand at bridge, let alone to signal a turn.

In these circumstances the steady depletion of the stock of drivers became disturbing. Industry rose magnificently to this challenge. The automobile was so thoroughly electrized that even a semi-paralyzed female could drive across the continent without ever invoking the aid of man. Of course there were a few flaws in the appointments. Here and there a woman drowned in a convertible when the top-raising mechanism failed at the onset of a thunderstorm and her legs weren't strong enough to get her out of the car. But these losses were minor.

There was a pause then as the captains of capitalism regrouped their inventive forces for another grand assault on the right to work.

We have been in the second stage of domestic inactivity for several years. Historians will come to refer to it as the era of the

Great Freeze. A complete dinner with appetizer and dessert is lifted from a bin at a supermarket, then stowed in the home freezer until somebody gets hungry. The markets seem almost ashamed to carry fresh produce along with the frozen goods. I notice that tomatoes, carrots, celery, and other items that do not lend themselves to freezing are now wrapped in cellophane to suggest that they are almost as good as the frozen stuff.

Think: When was a glass of fresh orange juice last served in your house? Are genuine lemons squeezed for genuine lemonade in the summer? When did you last see peas or lima beans shelled? Or rolls made from scratch? Ah, friend, the long arm of capitalism has reached into a kitchen that is now the focal point of counter-revolutionary activity—which is about the only kind of activity left.

The Great Freeze has been marked by other developments calculated to make muscles obsolete. Garbage is no longer toted out to the hogpen. It goes down the drain where it is chewed up by a noisy machine that is immune to trichinosis. There is a clothes dryer to save all that terrible reaching up that makes a woman so weak she can hardly turn on the television set. Most miraculous of all is the dishwashing machine. For only moderate expense any wife-saving man can install this apparatus. It takes only a little more time than the old fashioned sink operation and does almost as well. Besides, the children love to look and listen while it hisses and sanitizes.

Perhaps because the ruling class has run out of ideas for softening up the ladies, more attention has recently been given to the men. It is a sad fact that the men have jumped for the bait. They have been spending hundreds of millions to make themselves as weak as their women.

I have a friend well out in the commuting belt whose secret ambition is to be a member of the volunteer fire company. He is afraid he has ruined his chance for an invitation because he has become classified as a freak. He is the only man in the community, so far as he knows, who still uses his arms and legs to push a lawn mower.

"It's not just the hand mower, though that is probably the worst count against me," he confided. "My wife hangs the sheets in the sun because they get a wonderful smell. We don't have a food freezer because we don't use much frozen stuff. We compost all of our garbage instead of sending it down the drain. You can see why we look peculiar, and why some merchants have been chary with credit. In these days the family that isn't loaded with labor-saving conveniences is assumed to be too poor to buy them.

"There's been more talk because I have a small vegetable garden, about 20 x 50, and each spring I turn it over with a long-handled

No. 2 shovel. My neighbors do this with power tillers or else hire somebody with a tractor. What most worries me is that the children now ask, 'Daddy, do you really like to do all that work?' Damn it, I do."

Superficially, the do-it-yourself trend might seem to negate any idea that capitalism is resolved to eliminate labor. It is quite true that do-it-yourself has been encouraged by the ruling class. But take a closer look. Newspaper features, advertisements, pamphlets, and books that tell us how to do it always tell us which power tools to buy so that the doing becomes an exercise in the avoidance of exertion. Any do-it-yourselfer would be humiliated if his neighbor caught him sanding a table top by hand, drilling without the aid of electricity, or cutting a board with a hand saw. While there is presently no loss of face in using a hammer to drive a nail, builders are turning to nailing guns. The day will come when any man who drives as many as two ounces of nails a year will feel compelled—if only for his children's sake—to use power equipment.

Generations ago the onrush of our youthful, dynamic capitalism brought plumbing into the kitchen and bathroom, dooming the outdoor pump and the outdoor privy. Although Americans are neurotically absorbed in cleanliness, their bathrooms are by no means so automatic as their kitchens. Why this should be so is hard to comprehend. What with television dinners and other packaged poisons the housewife spends less time in the kitchen than in the bathroom.

Yet the bathroom remains the seat of manual labor. The vestigial muscles must be employed for a long list of tasks, no one of them a crushing burden in itself but cumulatively and collectively a load that few citizens can carry without beginning to doubt the merits of an economic system that imposes such hardships. A man exhausted by a grueling 30-minute workout with the power mower may find the effort required to close the door the most he can summon from his aching arms. And when, having closed it, he finds that he must rise to the necessity of getting a new roll of toilet tissue—well, this is the kind of situation that would cause him to make barricades of paving stones if he had the strength to pry them loose. Or lift them.

Sometimes the little things are even worse. Psychoanalysts, lawyers, and disgruntled wives have told me that nothing so quickly changes a wretched marriage into a miserable one as mishandling of the communal toothpaste tube. Often the cap sticks, and a mighty wrench is needed to loosen it. There will then be little strength left to squeeze from the bottom upward. The debilitated fingers will permit no more than a feeble embrace around the middle. (These desperate resorts can be avoided, of course, by using salt, which my



dentist tells me is every bit as good as toothpaste except that it's cheap.)

Well, there's a lesson here for the top dogs. If a toothpaste tube can cause man and wife to repudiate their solemn vows to share bed and bath forever, what's it going to do to an economic system that nobody vowed to cling to?

The top dogs, at long last, have seen the handwriting on the bathroom wall. Witness this report from Carl Spielvogel in *The New York Times* of January 20:

The feverish marketing race in the dentifrice industry is continuing. The Colgate-Palmolive Company is the latest entrant to come up with something new—toothpaste in an aerosol container.

Colgate Dental Cream is being sold in the Eastern part of the nation in a red and white aerosol container. The company contends that the container "makes dispensing of the dentifrice much easier than the generally accepted tubes."

The Colgate container requires the use of a tasteless propellant, which serves to push out the toothpaste. . . .

In short, the counter-revolution is being shifted from the kitchen to the john—in the nick of time. Now watch for new miracles of labor-saving. There will be hot, perfumed blasts to dry the lady who has bathed or showered. Some genius will devise a contraption to brush the teeth without using any muscles other than those involved in opening the mouth. An aspirin maker will create a pill with a built-in chaser to save the labor of filling and draining a glass of water. Of course there will be a self-flushing toilet that plays Bizet's First Symphony as soon as one is seated. The old problem of toilet paper will be solved by installing a gigantic roll above the ceiling when the house is built, sufficient for 15 or 20 years, which will feed downward like a web of newsprint on a series of rollers inside the wall. Six months before the roll is used up the automatic music machine will sound a warning with Mozart's Requiem.

That's just a sampling of the enervating goodies that capitalism is whipping up for us. More would be listed except that my typewriter is running out of aerosol.

When the bathroom becomes as push-buttoned up as the kitchen, the last chance for a socialist upheaval in the United States will be gone. Nobody will have the will or strength to upheave. The editors of *Monthly Review* are wasting their time. They had better take to the bush, where the rugged virtues of the pioneers are still kept alive by the prairie dogs, jack rabbits, and horned toads.

# THE WORLD OF SCIENCE

by Philip Morrison

## AUTOMATION

The word "automation," Carl Dreher tells us, "sprang full-grown from the forehead of . . . the executive vice-president of the Ford Motor Company." Here is a brief, witty, personal, simple, and yet subtle account of the whole matter from this thoughtful engineer-writer, one of a series of very successful popularizations of mathematical-technical subjects published by Norton as "primers for our time."\* A sketch of our first parents, with Eve tempted beyond denial by that apple displayed on a TV screen, will serve as a sample of the amusing but by no means saccharine tone of the many drawings and of the whole little book.

Our Russian contemporaries call it "avtomatika," without benefit of Vice-President Harder. It is ubiquitous and immediate; more than any other concept, it symbolizes the economy of today. IBM and ICBM are both parts of it; the ballistic missile and the punched card could very well serve as symbols of automation or of America, 1958. To say just what it is faces us with a more difficult problem, solved by Mr. Dreher in a quite successful way.

He approaches a full definition by steps. It is pretty clear to us what it was that the word originally described. That was "Detroit automation," assembly-line technique involving advanced mechanization of metal-shaping plus electronic control. An engine block, say, has to be produced from a raw casting. It might be done by hand-drilling and filing and sawing, at hopeless cost in time and effort. It is much more practicable, and indeed was the method of a generation or two, to use machine tools for actually removing metal, the machinist setting the tools, checking them, moving the work along, and measuring the progress of the work. Then the simpler of these operations might be taken over by the machine, and the man's hands and eyes freed from the labor. Indeed, the simplest lathe of the woodworker has only a rest for the cutting tools; all tool motion, giving the details of shape, is carried out by the hand of the artisan, holding the tool on the rest and moving it as his experienced eye directs. Since the seventeenth century at least, "machine tools" have

\* *Automation: What It Is, How It Works, Who Can Use It*, by Carl Dreher. W. W. Norton & Co., New York, 1957. 128 pages, with many line drawings by Herb Lebowitz. \$2.95.

given both precise support and accurate motion to the cutting edge. The machinist consults the blueprint, sets up his machine, checks and measures, and occasionally changes the methods of shaping and the tool itself. Every small general-purpose shop still operates in this way. But for decades, mass-production machining has used more and more nearly automatic machines, drilling many holes at once in predetermined sizes and positions, or using several different cutting edges as the work may require. Still many operations must be performed, and the workpiece must be transferred from machine to machine, to be precisely set in position on the bed of each new machine. In this stage one man does the work of several machinists, or of a whole regiment of hand sawyers and filers. Even so, there are apt to be a good many men around, watching signal lights, pushing buttons, moving metal with chains and handles, and so on. We now have reached the stage of the great automatic transfer machine, "300-foot long . . . labyrinth of motors, wiring, and unintelligible metal parts . . . one wonders how either engine blocks or human beings can find their way from one end to the other." Four thousand five hundred engine blocks can be recovered from one end of this complex organism each day, if some one at the other end has fed in the heavy castings. The photographs of such a machine are familiarly empty of workers, but that is because "when the photographers come in, the operators are shooed out of the setup" to improve the symbolism. Only one lonely man is shown among the machine parts; though "actually, quite a few people are kept around to maintain the flow." In spite of their presence, such a highly automated production line is "surely as much a wonder of the world as the seven of the ancients."

Dreher has a fresh chapter on the history of the movement, into which the above description of "Detroit automation" fits with unexpected smoothness. He chooses to begin the story with the account of the famous Humphrey Potter as told by the Victorian writer, the moralizing Samuel Smiles. This poor but able lad passed his days turning the valves on a clumsy Newcomen atmospheric engine, pumping water from some north country mine in the ugly dawn of the English Industrial Revolution. Making a "catch worked by strings from the beam of the engine," young Potter in 1713 made the valving automatic. He doubled the engine speed, gaining himself time for rest or play, and, says Dreher dryly, "in accordance with the formula, Potter was upgraded." He became a well-known engineer.

Less legendary is the account of Eli Whitney, who undertook to assemble muskets for the administration of John Adams. He proposed to make "ten or fifteen thousand stand of arms" all from in-

terchangeable, standardized parts. Thomas Jefferson had visited a gunshop organized in that way not far from Paris a few years before. But Whitney's mill, opened in Connecticut in 1800, far outshaded everything else that had been done. He took the gunmaker's craft, disassembled it and synthesized it into a modern industry. He controlled the sizes of the mating parts by a system of jigs and patterns. "A jig is a shape . . . along which a tool moves to produce replicas. Thus a ruler is a jig for drawing a straight line," writes Dreher. Not the cotton gin, but this development made Whitney successful in life, and ought to bring him his lasting fame.

An even older industry was automated in those days by a great but little-known American, Oliver Evans. As a young man, Evans thought out, built, and published in a famous and long-used book, a complete system for automatic flour-milling. Power had from antiquity been used to turn the great stones which ground the wheat into flour for bread. But Evans applied the power of the mill to lift the grain from the farmers' carts to a hopper high in the mill, whence it flowed downward to the rollers, was spread evenly over them by a power-driven rake, and was finally screened as it came from the rolls by power-agitated sieves. Combining a half-dozen techniques used here and there into a unified whole, Evans mass-produced flour in a continuous process without the need for human hands. "Evans' brother, who traveled extensively in efforts, usually unsuccessful, to collect royalties on Oliver's inventions, often found flour mills locked but in operation, without a soul in or near the premises."

Against such a historical background, the novelty of automation seems to disappear. What is all the fuss about if Eli Whitney did it? Is the term simply an international shorthand for technical advance, for "transferring skill to the machine"? There is that element in the concept, certainly. But automation is more than a system of production, growing from young Potter's automatic valves through Evans, Edison, and Henry Ford to the present electronic wonders. It is a kind of "protoengineering." It is basically a theoretical structure, which has given the power of analysis and the synthesis of control and communication wherever they occur, in the machine or in the animal, in the television set or the growth of language. This theoretical structure is itself not wholly new; it too grew gradually. But it attained real power only in the years since the close of the last war, and it has become fruitful only in the presence of electronic and mechanical technology of great power, and of mathematical and physical insight of great maturity. It is because automation so integrates the growth of science and technology that it is hard to define in a pithy phrase.

One central concept, which we may take to illustrate the nature of the body of concepts which comprise automation, is feedback. It is easy to form the idea of feedback from a simple example. Evans' flour mill, like the clockwork automata of the same period, wonderful devices which simulated a violin player, for example, is certainly a self-acting machine. But its actions are marked by stereotype; it always does the same thing. Start it off, and you know what it will do until it runs out of driving power or until it breaks down. Such mere clockwork, however complex, grand, or even useful, is but elementary in automation. Much more advanced in principle, even though simpler in detail, is the commonplace automatic heating system of nearly every house. Look at the operation of the heating unit. The coal or oil burns, and the heat flows to the rooms. A small part of the heat—the output of the system—is used to warm the simple metal strip of the familiar thermostat. If the heat is too much, the thermostat opens—makes, if you please, a simple decision between two alternatives—and stops the circulation of heat. When the room cools, the thermostat cools too, and the heat flow comes back on. In practice the scheme is more complicated today, but this will serve to make the present point. Such a machine as the heating system does not work by stereotype. No one can say how much fuel it will burn tomorrow, if it remains in good order. For that depends upon the whim of weather and housewife. The device works as much as it is needed. It determines its own need by sampling a small part of its output, which is "fed back" into the system. And in this simple but quite wonderful way the blindly self-acting machine has become responsive to its environment.

The first thermostated incubator was made in Ben Johnson's London by the Dutch inventor Drebbel. James Watt invented the flyball governor, familiar fitting of every old steam engine, which was also a kind of feedback control. Neither the device nor the applications, then, are really new. What is new is the theory, the conscious analysis of systems of every kind in terms like these, and built upon this analysis the numberless ways to seek and construct new and manifold examples.

When you reach for a pencil, your hand is guided in part by experience and estimate, as when you throw a ball. But feedback is present; the eye and the proprioceptive nerves gauge the position of the hand, and allow you to correct your initial aim. The sensory function is not only one of detecting the state of the environment but also of allowing self-correction of your acts of moving or changing the environment. What flows into the senses is interpreted as information, and used in these diverse ways. The flow of information, its use as preparation or as feedback, its measure—by counting

alternatives—all this is the subject matter of the theory of control and communication which marks the contemporary stage of automation. Dreher treats this topic rather lightly; his central theme is economics, but he does not omit the widespread importance and catholicity of the analysis which lies behind the gadgets.

He describes at some length a good sample of the machines which exemplify, if they do not comprise, automation. He includes both the familiar computers and some fresher examples. Everyone will read with a kind of recognition the tale of the "intracorporate struggles" around a big computer. In comes a hard-working engineer with a problem for the big brain; its priests turn him down: his problem is too easy for their powerful charge. He can learn, too, from this; next time, he asks for eight digits of precision (though he really needs only three), and so on. "It takes him some time to dig what he really needs out of the mass of data the computer showers on him, but still he is far ahead compared with manual computation." But his boss will save money and time by buying him a desk-sized computer to fill the gap between slide-rule and giant brain. Plenty of firms sell just such a device; Heath Company even sells a kit for one. Do it yourself!

The mechanical anesthetist, a device which measures brain potentials, and uses their behavior to control the input of anesthetic drugs, is foreseeable. It has worked on rats. Even a mechanized diagnostician can be imagined quite well; a computer fed all the physical data could produce a correlation, preliminary perhaps to the physician's final decision and personal insight. So it goes. From the machinist's lathe and borer, to the great continuous steel strip mill or petroleum refinery, to the province of mathematician or of physician, the machine finds its gropingly intelligent way.

What will it mean for the American economy? For Dreher, rather little in the overall pattern. Automation, in its indecent intimacy with the machines of war, has prolonged our just-ending boom. It has increased the rate of business investment in the formation of capital. This has been accompanied by a strengthening of the position of the big vis-à-vis the small concern. It tends to increase long-range planning by big fellows, and perhaps even to make more rational the managerial judgment, for which Dreher has some cutting phrases. So much for the bull market. In the bear market, automation has the potential to deepen the trough. For low-cost producers will survive; they will pay less in wages per unit of output. Still, the government's intervention can be relied upon to prevent a profound collapse like that of 1929-1941.

For the consumer, not much from automation is promised by our author. Costs in the factory will drop; but they are a small and de-

clining fraction of the costs borne by consumers, who pay for ads, yearly re-designs, and the rest of the high pressure. High productivity is a liability if the consumer is unable to buy, in debt to his ears, or part of the submerged fifth. Here war goods play their role; they siphon off the excess and pay for it through the tax machine.

In the tale of Avco, which converted its efforts from washing machines to nose cones in 1956, Dreher sees the model of the whole economy. It is too productive for its markets; automation makes goods too easily for an economy already dependent on consumer debt and government subsidy. Yet in the end—and here is the most individual and unexpected of all Mr. Dreher's fresh observations—the automatic factories will outrun the military needs too. Spending for welfare will be necessary, and may become acceptable to the businessman. The cold war will shrink as the automated output grows. But a welfare program would at once be a coup of winning proportions in the battle for minds, and a solution for the otherwise hopeless problem of low-cost production. If the business planners do not find the flexibility to take this step, they may have no second chance.

So the book ends. It is an unusually successful book, mixing some valuable abstract ideas with a clear exposition of history and economics. It is witty, and it is illustrated with a series of unexpectedly droll and apt line sketches. For the busy reader, for the man or woman without any adequate background in technical matters, for anyone at all who values a compact guide to new ideas, the book is a good buy, inexpensive in dollars and hours, but never diluted or cheap in thought. It is a first-rate primer; one misses most of all a bibliographic guide to the next steps in the curriculum. For to my way of thinking, these ideas represent exactly the living core of contemporary science, philosophy, and economics.

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*Science should not be an egoistic pleasure. Those who are fortunate enough to be able to devote themselves to scientific work should be the first to apply their knowledge in the service of humanity.*

—Karl Marx

## FRENCH SOCIALISM AT THE CROSSROADS

BY HARVEY GOLDBERG

What ails French Socialism?

"It is the progressive *cléricalisation* of the Party; there is clericalism whenever an institution, no matter what it is, becomes an end in itself rather than a way of serving the ideal which gave it life." The Party has become a contented clergy. The national leaders are nothing but cynical politicians; "the exercise of power seems to have consumed and destroyed their personality." Flaunting the ideal of human enlightenment, they have enforced strict censorship over news to the rank and file to conceal their crimes. "The Party papers, like *le Populaire* and *le Populaire Dimanche* have been devoted solely to adulation of the men in office." At the local level, the little chiefs are "weary, prudent, unenthusiastic, slow to react." A clubby atmosphere predominates, and the leadership has degenerated into *une équipe de camarades*. French Socialism? Just another political racket, played out by aging members (70 percent over 40; 37 percent over 50) in futile debates.

These are not, be it noted, the random jottings of Communist leader Thorez or Fascist leader Poujade. But the peroration comes, carefully reasoned, from the pen of André Philip, distinguished elder of the SFIO (Section française de l'internationale ouvrière, as the French Socialist Party is known) and stalwart of the movement since 1920. In a book full of fact and fury, *Le Socialisme Trahi* (Plon, 1957), he has ripped the mask away from his Party to reveal a congeries of blunders, confusions, and downright crimes which, if they add up to *molletisme*, have precious little to do with socialism. It is a damning indictment from *within*, an extended commentary on the sad failure of the SFIO to spearhead a progressive coalition under the Fourth Republic.

Others, from a greater distance, have traced the decline of the Socialist Party into just another political movement, uninspired in behavior, unsuccessful in recruitment, uncreative in program. Thus Duverger, the political theorist, has characterized the Party as "paralyzed by an inferiority complex *vis-à-vis* the Communist Party";

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Rimbert, the Socialist historian, found it aged, provincial, and dominated by petty bureaucrats; and, most recently, Werth, the British correspondent, has traced the collapse of its doctrine before the strong-arm policies he calls "National-Molletism." But Philip's book is more than a charge; it is a fundamental challenge to a movement in which he has played a leading role. Socialism, he says, has been betrayed, in action and in spirit; the Party stands on a brink beyond which there is no salvation; it must break new ground or perish.

Philip details those major failures of French Socialism which, in his view, add up to treason:

(1) *The bankruptcy of doctrine*—the adherence to Marxist analyses which Socialists no longer believe and which they fail to revise. The crude use of historical determinism has made them dishonest and lazy—a way of concealing their futility and avoiding the hard, pragmatic effort required to build a socialist society. "The success of socialism is far from certain," writes an angry Philip. "It will depend on our action." The repetition of Marxist sociology, once a brilliant abstraction of earlier conditions, has replaced an accurate knowledge of France. Can Socialists construct a program or plan a campaign, clinging as they do, to the original theorem of two eventual classes under capitalism, a handful of bosses and a mass of workers? Philip reminds his colleagues of the realities—the survival, despite mechanization and concentration, of peasants and shopkeepers; the burgeoning of the white-collar middle class; the gradual improvement, despite widespread misery, of the condition of workers.

(2) *The inadequacy of program*—the dismal failure to consider many of the crucial problems rooted in the psychological and cultural aspects of modern society. In spelling them out, Philip reminds Socialists (which ought hardly to have been necessary) that nothing human can be alien to them. Especially does he urge sensitivity to the 20th century's unique form of human exploitation—the effects of mechanized production. How good can the "good society" be, as Fourier constantly asked, without a creative approach to the tragedy of separating men from meaningful activity and riveting them into a perpetual robotry? When the human stuff is pulverized, Philip warns, the consequences for democratic socialism are dire; for men reflect the loss of personality by falling blindly into mass movements or escaping completely into a world of empty pleasures. Yet Socialists, living on past capital, ignore man's fate in the complex present.

(3) *The absence of moral sensitivity*—the sterile unconcern over the great colonial revolution, that weightiest of events in the balance of the future. With a billion and a half people living in areas that are either colonial or recently independent, Socialists, if their title

means anything, must develop an understanding deeper than they displayed at Suez or display now in Algeria. To repeat old phrases about imperialism is not enough; to ignore altogether the great surge toward modernization is sheer betrayal. If it means anything at all, socialism must be the core of support for those countries of Asia, Africa, the Middle East, and Latin America, struggling to be free, to plan their development, and to receive on honorable terms capital from abroad.

(4) And finally, the greatest failure, *the abuse of public office*—the dismal record of Mollet & Associates, which calls up repression and imperialism. Compromise, as Philip knows, is the heart of politics. And in France where the multiplicity of parties forces coalition politics, the Socialists either collaborate or starve from doctrinal asceticism. But compromise has its limits, and the SFIO has gone so far beyond them as to lose its inherent validity. There was the Suez fiasco, ludicrous militarily and dangerous economically. If the attack by Israel was justifiable, the move by France and England was cut from the cloth of imperialism. But Algeria, charges Philip, is the classic case of socialism ground into *molletisme*. A shockingly poor country, little industrialized, overpopulated, exploited for the profit of Europeans, Algeria should have been assured the friendship of French Socialists. Instead, Mollet betrayed both the Arab masses and the socialist cause.

The Premier's conversion to full-scale repression came on the morrow of his shock at Algiers on February 6, 1956, when violent imperialistic demonstrations were organized to greet him. Under a barrage of missiles and threats he retreated. The great novelist François Mauriac, as one might expect, bitterly attacked this "motionless schoolteacher, sitting there in his chair, and allowing himself to be pelted with inky balls of paper." But Philip no less savagely denounces a Premier "capitulating unconditionally under the pressure of fascist-like demonstrations." In the months that followed, the Mollet-Lacoste regime frustrated land reform in Algeria, muzzled the liberal press, filled the concentration camps with Arab and French liberals, and finally defeated all reasonable hopes with the infamous seizure of the Moroccan plane carrying the rebel leaders. Philip finds no possible justification for such crimes. On Algeria there can be no compromise with the principle of "recognizing genuine nationalist aspirations." And on the Socialist Party there can be no escape from the deepest self-analysis to understand how *molletisme* became possible and even admired.

All of which brings Philip to the point where he betrays his own intelligence. For he ends by saying what it is all too tempting to say: the Socialist Party is dead, long live the Socialist Party. But if the

disease is fatal and socialism has gone out of the heart of the movement, it profits little to tack pious hopes for recovery onto the end of the diagnosis. It's an old political custom, of course, and one well practiced by Socialists. (Who, better than Kautsky, could combine two opposing meanings into a single monstrous resolution? Who, better than Blum, could whirl like a dervish from the dialectic to piety in one seductive passage?)

Philip points a new direction, but who will follow him there? The SFIO is, in fact, even less competent than he suggests. Its external problem is quantitative: the decline of Party strength from 20 percent of the votes in the general elections of 1932 and 1936 to 14 percent in 1951; the decline of paid membership from 350,000 in 1946 to 111,000 in 1954. And its inner trouble is qualitative: an aging membership, which, in the absence of young recruits, becomes increasingly a party of *hommes mûrs*; the shift of its main centers from North and East to South and West, from the urban worker of the great cities to the petty bourgeois of town and village.

The reasons for all this have to do with the confusion of doctrine and the lack of basic commitment. Revolutionary doctrine has no relevance to the mild, reformist platform. Afraid to drop Marxism and incompetent to revise it, the Socialists, as Duverger has said, "have put it in the ice box and do not dare to let it out." Philip may call for truth and careful analysis, but who will shake the SFIO out of its torpor? The bureaucracy has become so *embourgeoisée*, the leaders so conservative, the offices so monopolized by incumbents that the Party seems no proper home for the workers, students, and intellectuals whom it so badly needs.

For the leaders of the SFIO it's all a mock battle in what a French historian once called *la République des camarades*. They feel more at home with leaders of the opposition than with their own followers. "What is symptomatic of all this," declares Philip, "is that the man of the Left, transferred into overseas territories, when he has under him a group of human beings over whom he can exert authority, easily becomes racist, imperialist, and chauvinistic." (Lacoste, the "Socialist" Resident Minister in Algeria, goes unmentioned but the reference seems obvious.) So, the SFIO seems less alive as a socialist movement than a fading portrait of Jaurès. It may survive for decades and the name too; parties and labels have a staying power of their own. Yet by his own analysis Philip has answered his plea for renewal.

But the problem of French, and of all European socialism ranges far wider than Philip's discussion admits. It roots in the question of *raison d'être*, of whether Socialist Parties can or should enjoy an

existence—beyond their formal one as electoral machines. The problem cannot even be approached without grasping some significant realities:

First, all Socialist Parties have moved toward the Right, whether in France and Italy where major Communist Parties have spotlighted the course, or in Scandinavia, the Low Countries, and England. The clue to this universal shift lies in the changing social structure of Europe, where the percentage of workers in the total population has declined while the scope of the middle class has widened. For mass parties, dependent on numbers rather than wealthy elites, this has involved the *embourgeoisement* of membership and program.

Second, before the growing rigidity of contemporary mass society there has been little faith in dynamic social change. Schiller's glorious cry in the age of the French Revolution ("And new life springs from the ruins") has no contemporary European equivalent. Without their dramatic historic vision, Socialists have accommodated themselves at best to efforts for greater welfare and at worst to simple political survival.

Third, the sources of mass discontent have become as much psychological and cultural as social and economic. How else understand Bednarik, astute Austrian observer, who, in *The Young Worker Today*, etches a picture of the worker, the same in Paris, London, or Vienna, seeking escape through the movies rather than salvation through socialism? Among frustrated men caught up in the bureaucratic web, as Gerth and Mills have noted, "fascist-type movements find their opportunity, especially if they couple revolutionary tactics with nationalist propaganda."

Finally, Europe has become increasingly insignificant, a satellite of one side or the other in the heat of the cold war. But while the iron law of oligarchy has been consistently at play to ensure privilege for socialist hierarchies, they have failed to create of Europe a bridge of peace and negotiation between the two worlds.

Is socialism, then, a curiosity, to be filed under history or obituary? Hardly. Consider the long humanistic tradition, and it seems apparent that a socialism, which is democratic and moral, corresponds to the deep (if inconsistent) yearning for justice. The substance of socialism, as Philip reveals in some of his best passages, is larger than this economic theory or that electoral campaign. Like the Enlightenment in its time or the Renaissance even earlier, it stands for the creative development of the integral man. Its aim, wrote Jaurès, "is independence of the will, active, free, and joyous. Whenever man is dependent and at the mercy of others, whenever the individual is subjugated by law or custom, then his humanity is denied."

Progress, E. H. Carr has said, "is a conscious moving on toward purposes which are felt to be worthy of human faith and human endeavor." In those terms socialism has a special relevance for the present. It is relevant to a France where the crumbling wall of politics is currently being replastered by a cadet from the near-meaningless Radical Party. And it is relevant to the West as a whole where the quality of life grows poorer from militarism, bigotry, and apathy. The Socialist Parties of Europe, especially in England and Scandinavia, have been notable for the welfare legislation they have sponsored. But socialism must reach out further to inspire public life and to give voice to a latent and benumbed radicalism. What this means is that socialism, whether through the revitalization of the old parties or the founding of new ones, must spearhead a tendency, a grouping of all those who care deeply about the quality of life.

If John Osborne, the explosive playwright, seems more the Socialist than Hugh Gaitskell, and Bourdet of *France-Observateur*, more the fighter than Mollet, it is much explained by spirit—by the willingness to know where the enemy is, by the courage to assault vested power, and by the most integral commitment to freedom and equality. What is tough but necessary is the reaching out over old barriers to renew a hope so mutilated by Communist bankruptcy and Socialist ineptitude. This program, yes, is hard and can wrack the nerves; but as the wily Voltaire once wrote, "a day suffices for a sage to know the duties of man."

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*Above all, we cannot afford not to live in the present.*

—Henry David Thoreau

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*Every opinion based on scientific criticism I welcome. As to the prejudices of so-called public opinion, to which I have never made concessions, now as aforetime the maxim of the great Florentine is mine: "Segui il tuo corso, e lascia dir le genti."*

—Karl Marx

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*Average cultivated man: Every form of idealism appeals to him, so long as it does not ask him to budge out of his armchair.*

—John Jay Chapman, *Practical Agitation*

## THE SOUTH AFRICAN TREASON TRIAL

BY FENNER BROCKWAY

The following review of *The South African Treason Trial* by Lionel Forman and Solly Sachs appeared in *Tribune*, the London left-wing weekly, just after the publication of the British edition of the book. Fenner Brockway, M.P., is the Labor Party's most authoritative spokesman on colonial affairs and an ardent champion of the rights and interests of the colonial peoples. *The South African Treason Trial* will be officially published in this country by Monthly Review Press on March 27th at \$5. Until then it can be purchased for immediate delivery at the special prepublication price of \$3.—THE EDITORS

Solly Sachs, South African trade union leader, and Lionel Forman, one of the accused in the South African treason trial have written a book which will become a classic in the literature of human equality. It is important now. It will be read as long as men struggle for liberty.

I say this because the South African treason trial is proving a turning point in history. It marks the coming of certainty to the African, Indian, and colored races that they will win. It marks the certainty of defeat to the white racialists. It is an occasion of decision for the human race.

No one can read the story of the trial without feeling this: the happy confidence of the 156 prisoners, the pitiful rage and futility of their persecutors, the wave of proud solidarity sweeping through the African people, the demoralization among the little men in government and their sycophants.

One is astounded that the Strijdoms and Swarts dare to claim superiority. These pages reveal a dignity and courage among the prisoners—Africans, Indians, Colored, and European—which make ministers, magistrates, and chiefs of police seem dwarfs.

Perhaps the most significant is the happy and almost light-hearted joking of the prisoners. Here we have Lavinia of Shaw's *Androcles and the Lion* brought to life. They are being tried for treason. The sentence may be death. They are just glad and defiant and proud. Nothing can conquer the human truth for which they stand.

The authorship of the book reflects this. Our old friend Solly Sachs we know—exiled in England for his battles for the African members of the Garment Workers' Union.

## THE SOUTH AFRICAN TREASON TRIAL

But it is Lionel Forman who is unique. Has a prisoner under a death charge ever before written and published the story of his trial whilst it was still going on—written it challengingly, glorying in his crime, pouring scorn on the prosecution, exposing to the world the depraved principles of the government which holds him?

This is courage not to be measured. Who is this Lionel Forman? I like his portrait: young, his eyes seeking for something yet sure, there is firmness there, too. He is thirty, a graduate from the two major Universities of South Africa, editor of the weekly, *New Age*, with a circulation of 50,000, barrister, father of two young sons.

Late one night, almost exactly a year ago, there was hammering on his door. "The maid's probably lost the key and wants us to open up for her," he said to his wife, but he knew that the maid wouldn't hammer as loudly as that.

"I am Sergeant Du Pisanie," said one of the two Special Branch men. "I have a warrant for your arrest."

Forman didn't worry. He often broke Strijdom's laws. He read and owned illegal literature. He served his African guests with liquor—maximum penalty three years. He invited non-European friends to spend a weekend at his home. Maximum penalty five years.

"You can laugh," said Sergeant Du Pisanie. "This is high treason. You can get hanged for treason."

One hundred and forty men and women were dragged from their beds that night. Africans, Indians, Europeans, Coloreds; doctors and laborers, teachers and students, a university principal, a tribal chief, ministers of religion, a Member of Parliament; young and old, sick and healthy, graduates and illiterates. One thing united them: all were fighting for human equality, for the recognition of human personality, whether the pigment of skin be black, brown, white.

This book tells the nearly incredible story of the twelve months which have followed—the humiliations under arrest, the retention of *apartheid* even when whites and blacks were prisoners together, the cage in which the prisoners were herded in court, the batoning and shooting of defenseless supporters outside the court, the extraordinary interpretation of treason, the stupidity of so many witnesses for the prosecution, the attempt to keep the prisoners in custody during the long preliminary hearing (still going on), the continuous sacrifice of thousands of supporters of all races to meet the costs of the defense and to keep the families of the prisoners from want.

Only now, with the release of 61 of the prisoners, has a little of the tension relaxed.

Two chief impressions the book leaves with me.

The first is the decision of the prisoners to conduct their case

not with the purpose of defense, not to avoid sentence, but with the purpose of attack, to expose the government, to reveal the indecencies of the Special Branch, to show to the world the kind of police state, comparable only to Nazi Germany, which Malan and Strijdom have created. Their counsel has more than obeyed these instructions. Strijdom and the whole beastly outrage of *apartheid* are on trial, not the 156 prisoners who have striven to end the prison which is South Africa.

The second impression is the dignified restraint which the African, Asian, and colored populations have shown under the indignity of the contempt poured upon their color. Police witness after police witness called during the trial acknowledged that the spokesmen of the African and Indian Congresses always impressed on their audiences the duty of refraining from violence.

Only once did a detective break this sequence. The effect was so startling that everyone in court sat up, alert. This cross-examination followed:

BERRANGE (Counsel for the Defense): You say a speaker said, "It is time to shoot Malan?"

MOSILELE: Yes.

BERRANGE: How do you spell shoot?

MOSILELE: S-H-O-O-T.

BERRANGE: Now read the letters you have written down in your notes. Is it not C-H-E-C-K?

MOSILELE: Yes.

BERRANGE: Does that spell "Shoot"?

MOSILELE: No.

BERRANGE: In fact your notes show that the speaker said "It is time to check Malan?"

MOSILELE: Yes.

BERRANGE: Then why did you say "shoot"?

MOSILELE: It was a mistake.

I am not going to plead with readers of *Tribune* to buy this book. It is not a duty to have it. It is a privilege.

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*Democracy is complete identification with the poorest of mankind.*

—Gandhi



## **WORLD EVENTS**

*By Scott Nearing*

### **Our Expanding Economy**

President Eisenhower's Economic Report, transmitted to Congress on January 20th, is built around the assumption that the United States economy will continue to expand. Wrote the President: "Financial conditions are increasingly favorable to resumption of economic growth . . . to keep our economy stable and to encourage sound economic growth . . . to achieve sustainable economic growth and improvement in the years ahead. . . . There are good reasons for confidence that a vigorous expansion of our economy can be sustained over the years."

Two thoughts come to mind as we read these words. First, can any economy continue to expand indefinitely? Second, does the history and the nature of United States economy justify hope for continued expansion?

Universal (or natural) forces are not one-directional. On the contrary, they pulsate like the human heart, alternately expanding and contracting. If the human heart followed the President's policy of continuous expansion, like the frog in the fable it would burst. If action and reaction are opposites in social affairs as they are in mechanics, an impulse to expand should be followed by an impulse to contract. On no other assumption can a biological or social organism hope to survive.

Turning from philosophy to history, we find this same principle of expansion and contraction in operation. Thirty years ago, the then President of the United States announced the achievement of permanent prosperity, or, in the current phrase, perpetual expansion. In 1929 came the depression setback. Prosperity had been permanent for exactly five years—1923 to 1928.

The present era of economic expansion began in 1940. It has continued, with two minor interruptions, through the ensuing years. But the two eras of expansion, which reached high points in 1928 and 1958, were separated by a decade of recession and depression.

Five major influences were responsible for both periods of economic expansion: (1) an unprecedented number of discoveries and inventions which made possible (2) the rapid utilization ("using up" and "exhaustion") of natural resources; (3) spending and borrow-

ing for wars fought outside the United States; (4) stimulated demand for gadgets and jimcracks; (5) an immense increase in the annual tax bill and in government spending, chiefly for armament.

Economic expansion in the 1920s and 1950s led to price inflation, a rapid rise in debt, depression in agriculture and in some of the older industries, and finally, in 1929, to a heavy slump. Many factors suggest that the time is close at hand for "continuous economic expansion" to go the way of "permanent prosperity."

### Madhouse Budget

"Missile Age Budget" is the caption used by one United States newspaper over a story dealing with the 1958-1959 budget estimates, which present "the biggest peacetime spending program in United States history." The budget reads like this:

For future war	\$45.9 billion
Past wars (veterans, interest)	12.9 "
Labor and welfare, commerce and housing, general government	6.6 "
Miscellaneous	8.5 "
	<hr/>
	\$73.9 "

Imagine any nation calling itself humanitarian and peaceloving spending \$59 billion out of a \$74 billion budget for organized destruction and mass murder. Such a proposal could come only from a madhouse.

### Permanent Enemies

One of Britain's Prime Ministers is credited with the axiom: Britain has no permanent friends, only permanent interests. The formula has two advantages. It allows London to shop around among the neighbors for temporary friends in pursuit of its permanent interests.

Lord Palmerston's formula may be reversed: Britain has no permanent enemies, only permanent interests. On this basis, the enemies of yesterday may become friends tomorrow as London shifts the pawns in the power game.

State Department strategists have worked out their own formula: The United States has no permanent friends, only permanent enemies. Who are these permanent enemies? Those who differ with Washington ideologically. This formula divides the nations into three groups—enemies, possible friends, and immoral neutrals. Enemies, by definition, are always on the other side. Neutrals refuse to join power blocks. State Department policymakers are left to pick their

friends from the third of mankind who are neither enemies nor neutrals. The results of such a limitation hampered the United States delegates at the December conference of NATO countries in Paris. It appears in an even more restrictive form in the tattered membership of the Baghdad Pact and of SEATO.

Diplomats who propose to tip the balance of world power in their own favor should avoid rigidity and preserve a high measure of maneuverability. The Palmerston formula meets these requirements. The Dulles formula predooms its backers to frustration and ultimate failure.

### **We Take It for Granted in the USA**

That we have permanent enemies.

That the existence of enemies makes increased arms spending necessary.

That higher arms spending (and higher taxes) are means of insuring prosperity.

That Germany, Japan, and other "free" nations must be more and more heavily armed.

That armament, to be effective in 1958, must include nuclear arms and guided missiles.

That a sufficiently large quantity and variety of sufficiently destructive weapons, will stimulate business and insure peace.

That the nation with the highest destructive potential will be best able to survive.

That when Napoleon and Hitler applied this formula to the public relations of France and Germany, they were on the wrong track, but that when Eisenhower, Dulles, and Nixon apply the same formula to the public relations of the United States, they are on the throughway to prosperity and peace.

### **Planned Farming**

Individual farming, whether on the level of quarter-acre plots in South Asia or 320-acre stretches in Iowa, suffers from several limitations, the most serious of which is climatic. Crops on individual farms may be wiped out by flood, drought, or hail, and the farmer and his family be left destitute.

Against this background of experience, big capitalist farms in Texas and California and large collective and state farms in the Soviet Union which are spread over thousands of acres, gained certain advantages in specialization and variety of crops, in mechanization and general planning. But they were still subject to climatic limitations.

Two years ago, the Soviet Union began plowing virgin and unused land in Siberia. One result of this venture was enlarged acreage. Another, and probably an unexpected result, was climatic. The Soviet Minister of Agriculture in a press conference early in January, 1958, noted that when there was a crop failure due to drought in the central black-earth belt of European Russia, "the Eastern areas usually got a sufficient amount of precipitation, and good harvests there can compensate for crop failure in the west." This was the situation in 1957, when "there was a drought in the Volga regions. However, the fine crop in the Altai and Siberia provided the State with 645 million poods of grain from those regions."

A further effect of the establishment of the eastern bread basket was specialized multi-crop farming in the west. In the Ukraine, for example, the area sown to cereals had been diminished and the area allotted to sugar beet and cattle raising had been increased.

This experience led the Ministry to work out a seven-year development plan for Soviet agriculture. Under this plan, Soviet agricultural areas are being grouped into 39 zones, each with different climatic and geographical characteristics, and each one specializing in one or more branches of farming.

Working in cooperation with the Academy of Agriculture and local organizations, the Ministry of Agriculture is studying the most advantageous pattern of farming in each of these 39 zones, so that maximum benefits can be derived under the given soil and climatic conditions and the best harvests secured from each hectare of land, with minimum expenditure of labor. An integrated system of specialized machinery will be provided for each zone and each region.

More than 4,000 farm experts are engaged in working out this program. They are taking advantage of Soviet experience, supplemented by the best achievements of scientific farming abroad. Collective and state farms in each zone and region will base their work on the most up-to-date experience both inside and outside the Soviet Union.

Soviet planning, heretofore, has been applied chiefly to industry, mining, transport, and cultural institutions, with agriculture as a stepchild. This new development brings agriculture into the area of central planning.

### On the Moon

Soviet scientists, early in January, 1958, announced that they hoped to be on the moon within two years. It would take more than a year, they said, to digest the information which they had secured from their experience with Sputniks I and II and perhaps another

year to make preparations for the trip to the moon.

Soviet youngsters, bubbling with excitement over the prospects which this announcement opened before their generation, wrote in to their magazine *Pionerskaya Pravda* requesting priority bookings. "I am a pupil of the sixth form," wrote Vladimir Gagarchov from a village in the Novosibirsk region, "I want to be the second one to go to the cosmos. . . . Laika, the dog, was first, and so I'm going to be the second passenger. I am not afraid of death. I am not interested in it, but I am interested in the cosmos." Four girls from Tyumen, Siberia, in fifth form, and therefore presumably 12 years old, wrote a joint letter: "Remember us when the preparations for flying to other planets are made. We want to go." Vladimir Makin wrote from a village in the Altai Territory: "I have talked to my mother. We discussed the matter and decided to ask if I could be taken as a passenger on the Sputnik which will go into space with some people aboard. I am very healthy, and I have an excellent memory."

### Soviet Football

Soviet football teams played 263 games against teams from abroad during 1957, reports the *Moscow News*. Of these games Soviet teams won 172 games (65 percent), lost 49 (19 percent) and drew 42 (16 percent). Winning two-thirds of the games played during a season is an excellent record for any group of teams.

About thirty years ago Western coaches were telling the world, with straight faces: "No use for those Bolsheviks to go in for organized games. They have never been able to play such games and probably never will." History has answered these experts in the 1957 records for football, basketball, and ice hockey. Like other members of the human family, Russians are able to think, plan, work, and play socially.

### Occupied China

We were discussing the name used in the West for the Island of Taiwan. Certainly no one except a corporation lawyer would call it "China," anymore than an anatomist would pick up a finger and call it the human body. A finger is a small part of a larger organism. Taiwan, with its 9 million inhabitants, is a small part of China, with its 650 millions.

Just as certainly no one in his right mind could refer to Taiwan as "free." The Taiwan population had no choice back in 1948-1949 when United States armed forces moved Chiang Kai-shek's 600,000 soldiers onto the island, surrounded them with the strong Seventh Fleet shield, and put an air umbrella over their heads. No population

of 9 million wants a half-million army quartered on it indefinitely. Occupation by a foreign army is the badge of dependence and subserviency.

Since Taiwan was surrounded by United States armed forces protecting Chiang's garrison, American business has been investing in various Taiwan minerals, agriculture, and other enterprises. The economic penetration was made easy by the presence of United States armed forces and by the well-staffed Embassy and Information Bureau. The island is trebly occupied: by Chiang's army, by Washington's navy and air force, and by New York's Big Business. To make the occupation complete, Congress has authorized the President to make war in case the Peking Government moves to drive out the Chiang rebels and reestablish its sovereignty over the island.

These historical facts brought our discussion to a head. Taiwan is neither "China" nor is it "free." It is a part of China, however, and it is thoroughly occupied—militarily, economically, politically. Facts had decided our argument. Taiwan is "Occupied China."

We turned our attention to South Korea, South Vietnam, Okinawa, the Philippines, Japan. Everywhere the story repeated itself. Each of these territories is occupied by Washington's armed forces and penetrated (or perhaps more accurately, invaded) by Wall Street, Pittsburgh, and Detroit. The Far East is occupied by the same forces that hold Taiwan in their grip.

We turned our eyes across the Atlantic, to the NATO sessions in Paris. President Eisenhower and his incomparable Secretary of State were out to occupy all member countries with United States bases filled with Washington's hydrogen bombs. Incidentally, most of these countries were already occupied by Washington's diplomats, Treasury hand-out men, and military forces armed with conventional weapons, while United States planes, equipped with atomic war-heads, were patrolling the skies.

What is true of Taiwan and the Far East is equally true of the Near East and Western Europe. They are invaded by Wall Street capital and occupied by armed forces strategically placed to defend United States investments.

True, these areas make up the body of the "Free World" about which we have heard and read so much. The same misinformers who assure us that fragmented Taiwan is "China" and that occupied Taiwan is "free," make the same assertions about the Atlantic powers. While the adjective "free" is being bandied about, Washington and Wall Street are busy occupying.

We turned from our analysis and discussion with two new terms: Occupied China; The Free World is the Occupied World.

(continued from inside front cover)

copy of MR and you hope they will want to become subscribers.

The manuscript of Ann Braden's book, tentatively entitled *The Wall Between*, is about to go to the printer with instructions to rush it through as fast as possible. We are not yet in a position to announce a publication date, but we can say that the price will be \$5 on publication and \$3 before publication. Everyone who has read the manuscript is enthusiastic about it, and we are confident that this will be one of MR Press's most important publications.

To teachers and students in comparative economic systems courses may we suggest that the articles by Paul Sweezy on Poland (January), European Socialism, East and West (February), and Yugoslavia (beginning on page 362 below) should make very useful assigned or supplementary reading material. To facilitate their use for this purpose, we will be glad to supply packages of the three issues together for \$1 each.

Reviews of the English edition of *The Chinese Economy*, by Solomon Adler, are beginning to come in. Here are two sample quotations: "Mr. Adler's book is most lucidly written and carries conviction in every line . . . the first to give a complete and systematic account of the new economy." (*The Cambridge Review*, November 9, 1957.) "A most valuable, well-written, and perceptive study, fresh and frank." (*The Political Quarterly*, December 1957.) Please use these quotations when you ask your librarian to order this book.

Which reminds us that we have had a good response to our request of last month that you ask for additional copies of our new book catalogue and magazine brochure and use them in soliciting orders from libraries and friends. The request still holds. Indications are that the material is serving its purpose well.

We have been asked to announce for the benefit of LA area subscribers that on Sunday, March 16, Barrows Dunham will speak on "The Nature of Heresy" at a meeting sponsored by the LA Independent Forum. Time: 8 p.m. Place: Channing Hall, 2936 West 8th Street. Admission: 90¢.

Scott Nearing's lecture schedule in Southern California is as follows: San Diego, March 19, 8 p.m., Unitarian Fellowship. LA, March 21, 8 p.m., First Unitarian Church. LA, March 22, 8 p.m., Cultural Center (City Terrace). Santa Monica, March 23, 3 p.m., Milse Play House. LA, March 28, 8 p.m., Hayward Hotel. LA, March 29, 8 p.m., Ruskin Art Club. Van Nuys, March 30, 8 p.m., Unitarian Church. Other meetings are still in the arrangement stage.

We recently received a letter from I. O. Horvich from Johannesburg, South Africa. It reads in part: "As accused No. 84 who sits next to Lionel Forman, I am most keen to get your edition of his book. You will understand that after nine months in court and having to trek 1,000 miles up to Johannesburg, I am rather broke. I would esteem it a favor if you would send me a copy but defer payment till I can pay." To Mr. Horvich goes a present of *The South African Treason Trial* with our best wishes for the speedy release of him and his fellow traitors to the inhuman doctrine of *apartheid*. If you want to learn about their case, order the book at the special prepublication price of \$3. If you want to help them fight their case through, send a financial contribution to South Africa Defense Fund, 4 West 40th Street, New York 18. Your assistance is very much needed.

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